Anastasius Sinaita: The Guide Chapter 9: Concerning Nature and Hypostasis

In Book three Chapter 3 of On the Orthodox Faith John of Damascus writes the following.

However, the reason for the heretics' error is their saying that nature and hypostasis (person) are the same thing.

The editor has a footnote that reads "Anastasius Sinaite. The Guide 9 (PG 89.140ff)."  This one sentence is used by Jay Dyer to assert that the West is full of heresy because they allegedly confuse or conflate person and nature. 

11:32 Actually Gerard has a chapter, uh, in his book Church Schism papacy where he points out that that leads to the medieval Latin view of the mysticion corporis that's juridical and then the mysticium corporis that's mystical. So they kind of split up these different kind of views of like the juridical body of Christ which is like the, um, the hierarchy and then there's the, like, the lower level Body of Christ which is, you know, the the mirror, you know, uh, peasants or whatever. And then there was even a, I forget the guy's name but, uh, the, the, the two bodies of the king like the guy who you know wrote that famous book that was kind of analyzing the how this played into the Western conception of church and state. So I'm not trying to go crazy here I'm sorry but but the point is that the the way that you view God and person and nature as Saint John Damascus says all heresies arise from the failure to distinguish nature in person. And distinguishing doesn't mean composition or division necessarily it just means distinction.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ozbc1wp3eY

I am not going to refute Jay Dyer's absurd notion that the West does not distinguish between person and nature.  The point is to have the full reference from Anastasius which is nowhere to be found in English. This translation was made using Gemini.

pgs. 134-142

The Guide: Chapter IX

Concerning Nature and Hypostasis

[IX, 1] 9. Concerning Nature and Hypostasis; from the Holy Synod at Nicaea.

There once cropped up a certain evil pair, a seed of tares from the heresiarchs (just like a certain Annas and Caiaphas, or Pilate and Herod), blaspheming against God; I mean Arius and Sabellius, the teachers of Severus. These men also said that nature and person ($prosopon$) are the same thing.

Sabellius, on the one hand, spoke of one person and one essence (ousia) in the Holy Trinity; Arius, on the other hand, spoke of three persons and three essences. Both of them, however, said that nature and person are the same thing. Overturning their impiety and such a mindset, the holy, blessed, and first-born of the Holy Spirit—the Ecumenical Synod of the 318 renowned Fathers in Nicaea—clearly teaches us that essence ($ousia$) or nature ($physis$) is one thing, and hypostasis is another. Thus it cries out:

"But those who say: 'There was a time when the Son of God was not,' and 'Before He was begotten He was not,' and that 'He came into existence from nothing,' or who assert that the Son of God is of another hypostasis or essence, or is changeable or alterable—these the holy catholic and apostolic Church anathematizes."

Let them stand, therefore, condemned as criminals before this holy and blessed Synod, paying the penalty for their own blasphemies: both the followers of Severus and Dioscorus, and the entire assembly of their ten-horned vanity, who say that nature and hypostasis—that is, person—are the same thing.

For behold, the angelic choir of the holy Fathers teaches that essence is one thing and hypostasis is another. For they did not say: "those who say [the Son is] from another hypostasis that is essence," but rather "from another hypostasis OR essence," clearly teaching us that hypostasis is one thing and essence is another. And they did not stop the discourse at this point, but they even repeated such an expression through this doubling, confirming and establishing it; and he says again:

"For we know the Father as Father, and the Son as Son, and the Holy Spirit as Holy Spirit; one essence, but three hypostases."

And they did not say "three essences or three hypostases," nor did they say "three natures and three persons," as the foolish ones say, but rather one essence and three hypostases, saying that essence is one thing ($allo$) and hypostasis is another ($heteron$).

Behold the foundation-stone of the faith of the Fathers! Behold the root and beginning and basis of piety! Behold the luminaries and heralds of the truth! Behold the unshakable and invincible pillars and defenders! Behold the spirit-bearing and prophetic men, equal to the angels! They say nature is one thing and hypostasis is another. And who, finally, is that man who is able to overturn such a canon and definition and law?

For I am persuaded and I so believe that there were present in that holy Synod god-bearing men, who possessed a prophetic and apostolic measure and way of life before God; and it is permitted for them to say with all boldness even to those [others]: "Even if an angel from heaven should preach a gospel to the Church contrary to what we have preached as the gospel and what we have proclaimed to her, let him be anathema—both he and his preaching."

Therefore, let the Catholic Church take courage, having 318 holy advocates who are in agreement, saying that nature is one thing and hypostasis is another; for the gates of Hades shall not prevail against her, nor shall they overturn such a definition and law. So then, as before God, I say without partiality or prejudice, that to those who think correctly against Severus and Dioscorus and all those who say that nature, hypostasis, and person are the same thing, the Holy Synod in Nicaea is found to have taken place; and not only that, but also against the impious Nestorius; for he also, like Severus, says that person is nature.

For if nature is person, then the Holy Synod of Nicaea deposed Sabellius without cause—he who spoke of "one person" regarding the one essence of the Holy Trinity. If nature is person and person is nature, how was Arius anathematized for speaking of "three natures" regarding the three persons of the Godhead?

If "nature" signifies "person," I proclaim a great curse upon Severus and Theodosius, which shall be upon all their people who speak of Christ [being] "from two natures"; for they will certainly be found also to be speaking of Him as being from two persons, if indeed nature and person are the same thing. How, then, will they be able to bring a charge against Nestorius, while they themselves are thinking the things of Nestorius?

For if Christ is from two persons, it is manifest that the person of the man pre-existed in the womb, and then in this way was united into the person of the Godhead of the God-Word. If Christ is from two "personal natures," behold, the one person is addressed as God-Word; let those who say that nature and person are the same thing tell us, then, the address and the name of the other person of Christ; for a person is never without a name.

If you sincerely and without prejudice assert that nature and person are the same, then commit to saying "one person"regarding the "one essence" of the Godhead [the Trinity], and we shall cease from the struggle. If the persons are according to the number of the natures, then say "three natures" regarding the "three persons" of the Trinity, and we will no longer trouble you.

When you say that Christ is consubstantial ($homoousion$) with the Father according to the Godhead and consubstantialwith us according to the humanity—if essence (ousia) and person (prosopon) are the same thing—then say that He is "con-personal" ($homoprosopon$) with the Father according to the Godhead and "con-personal" with us according to the humanity, and we shall cease the war. If nature and person are the same thing, and since the persons of men are many and innumerable, then say that our natures are also many, and we shall be silent and fight no more.

Stand before me a little while, O heretic, and receive—just as Goliath did—the Davidic stones from the sling! Since Severus confesses that Christ is from two hypostases, that is, persons, it is manifest that you say He is composed from a Godhead and from a humanity; for these are what you address as "hypostases"—that is, the Godhead and the humanity. When, therefore, you say that He (that is, Christ) is perfect after the union in Godhead and perfect in humanity, it is manifest that you are convicted of confessing Him in two hypostases, that is, persons—if indeed nature, hypostasis, and person exist as one thing, as you lay down the law.

Scholion: A saying of an Orthodox to a Theodosian: It is sufficient for those who think rightly to say that Christ is "perfect from Godhead and from humanity"; for the phrase signifies the two natures.

Scholion: When the heretic said, "The [phrase] 'from two natures' rather signifies that He is from Godhead and from humanity," the Orthodox man, smiling, said: "Therefore, O best of men, that He is 'perfect in Godhead and in humanity' clearly represents Him [as being] in two natures."

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[IX, 2] <Testimonies of the Holy Fathers who also say that nature is one thing and hypostasis is another.>

And so that we do not seem to our opponents to be speaking "from our own house," let us call into our midst the holy Fathers, who say that nature is one thing and person is another. I do not know if, perhaps fearing the deposition [inflicted] by Severus, they [the opponents] will no longer dare to utter the expression "two natures."

I shall set forth first, as the pre-eminent one, the divinely-inspired Cyril, since, as they believe, they attempt to wage war against us using him. For he said, speaking thus to the Easterners:

"Regarding the evangelical and apostolic expressions concerning the Lord, we know that theologians make some common to one person, while they divide others as between two natures." Behold, the Father clearly does not say that nature and person are the same thing.

"But," [the heretic] says, "Cyril made a defense to Eulogius concerning such an expression."

Scholion: It must be known that even in that very Letter to Eulogius, the holy Cyril spoke of the "one and the other" nature of the Godhead and of the flesh of Christ.

Tell me, O heretic, what is this "defense"? For if the marvelous Cyril withdrew from communion with the Easterners after such an expression, then show it; but you will not be able to show this. Therefore, having remained in communion with those who confess two united natures, it is manifest that he himself also thought the same things.

Did he also reject Proclus, who openly and to everyone proclaimed two natures? Did he also cast out Ambrose, who taught the expression of two natures, and whose testimonies he [Cyril] brought forward in the Synod of the Ephesians? Did he also push away Isidore of Pelusium, who wrote to him regarding the two natures of Christ—a man whom the holy Cyril even addresses as his own "father"?

Furthermore, not only in the Letter to the Easterners, but also in the Answers to Hermeias who asked if nature is one thing and hypostasis another, the Father clearly says thus:

"Yes, they are different ($heteron$), and the difference between them is great."

Likewise, the god-minded Basil says to Amphilochius:

"The hypostasis has this [kind of] difference compared to the essence ($ousia$), as the particular ($idikon$) has compared to the common ($koinon$)." Having received this [teaching], the holy Amphilochius says concerning Christ:

"Double in essence ($ousia$), but not double in hypostasis." This testimony of Amphilochius was again brought forward by the God-revealer Cyril in Ephesus against the impious Nestorius. Likewise, in the Letter to Seleucus, the son of Trajan, Amphilochius uses the same expression, saying:

"The double natures ($physeis$) concur into one person ($prosopon$)."

Do you hear the harmony of the Fathers and of the blessed Cyril, saying that nature is one thing and person is another? And how, finally, do you not cease whispering in vain and saying: "Nature is not without a person (aprosopos), but nature and person are the same thing"?

Show me from which of the Fathers you received the authority to say this! But you will not be able to show it, unless [you cite] Arius, Sabellius, and Nestorius, who say that nature and person are the same thing. Therefore, overturning such a dogma, all the blessed Fathers—and especially those around Ambrose, Gregory, and Athanasius—proclaim one nature of God in three persons ($prosopois$), that is, hypostases, and not three essences, but one; just as the blessed Synod of the 318 God-bearing Fathers in Nicaea taught.

But these "wise" ones and new orators have chosen to cast themselves down into ten thousand abysses and blasphemies, so that, as they suppose, they might insult the Holy Council of Chalcedon and the Catholic Church of Christ.

But if you wish, I will speak to you more summarily. All those who, according to the definition of Greek philosophy, speak in an Aristotelian manner, of natures as hypostases and persons, are not able to speak of three hypostases regarding the Holy Trinity, lest they be found speaking of "three natures" like Arius. Nor, again, is it possible for them to confess two natures in Christ our God, lest they be forced to confess two persons and hypostases in a Nestorian manner regarding Him; for Nestorius also received from Aristotle [the habit of] saying that natures are hypostases.

But the Holy Church, having fled from Aristotelian and Greek vanities, believing the things concerning Christ in a Gospel-like and Apostolic way (as was said a short while ago), does not say that nature and hypostasis are the same thing.

But what will the followers of Severus say to all this? Perhaps they will say: "Regarding the discourse on the Trinity, nature and hypostasis are not the same thing; but regarding the Incarnation of Christ (the one of the Holy Trinity), nature and person—that is, hypostasis—are the same thing; for there is no nature without a person (aprosopos)."

When they say these things, I eagerly receive the statement and embrace such a definition with open hands; I do not reject it, but I go along with it. What impious thing, then, is born for them from this? And into what abysses of destruction and blasphemy do they fall? Listen, O faithful one, to a certain account and dramatization by us regarding such things that took place in Alexandria with the Theodosians and Gaianites, who were contending with us there that nature and person are the same thing regarding the economy of Christ.

For I will now add this along with those things for the information of those who preside over the pious faith of the Holy Catholic Church.

The Confession of Dositheus Decree 9 in Greek and Latin

Decree 9 of the Confession of Dositheus defines faith as correct knowledge. The most common translation of that passage is as follows:

We believe that no one can be saved without faith. By faith we mean the right notion that is in us concerning God and divine things, which, working by love, that is to say, by [keeping] the Divine commandments, justifies us with Christ; and without this [faith] it is impossible to please God.

http://www.crivoice.org/creeddositheus.html

The words of the text are quite straightforward in English nevertheless it would do good to examine the Greek and Latin texts to get a fuller sense of what "right notion" means. 

Creeds of Christendom, vol 2, Philip Schaff 

The following analysis of the text is from Gemini.

This image contains a parallel text in Koine/Modern Greek and Latin. It is a theological decree, specifically Decree IX (Decretum IX) from the Confession of Dositheus (Synod of Jerusalem, 1672), which defines the nature of faith and its role in salvation.

Greek Transcription

Ὅρος θ'.

Πιστεύομεν μηδένα σώζεσθαι ἄνευ πίστεως. Καλοῦμεν δὲ πίστιν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν ἡμῖν ὀρθοτάτην ὑπόληψιν περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν θείων, ἥτις ἐνεργουμένη διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης, ταὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, διὰ τῶν θείων ἐντολῶν, δικαιοῖ ἡμᾶς παρὰ Χριστοῦ καὶ ταύτης ἄνευ τῷ Θεῷ εὐαρεστῆσαι ἀδύνατον.

Latin Transcription

DECRETUM IX.

Credimus neminem sine fide salvari: fidem autem appellamus certissimam, quæ in nobis est, de Deo rebusque divinis, persuasionem; quæ quidem operans per caritatem, id est, per divinorum mandatorum observationem, justificat nos apud Christum et sine qua nemo potest placere Deo.

English Translation (for context)

Decree 9.

We believe no one to be saved without faith. And by faith, we mean the most upright conviction regarding God and divine things, which exists in us; which, working through love, that is to say, through the [keeping of] divine commandments, justifies us through Christ; and without which it is impossible to please God.

Would you like me to provide a more detailed linguistic breakdown of specific terms used in this text? 

"And by faith, we mean the most upright conviction regarding God and divine things, which exists in us". what is the greek part translated thusly

The specific Greek phrase from the text that corresponds to your English translation is:

"...καλοῦμεν δὲ πίστιν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν ἡμῖν ὀρθοτάτην ὑπόληψιν περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν θείων..."

Word-for-Word Breakdown

To see how the translation is built, here is a breakdown of the Greek terms:

Greek Word Transliteration Translation

καλοῦμεν kaloumen we call / we mean

δὲ de and / but

πίστιν pistin faith

τὴν οὖσαν tēn ousan which exists (literally "the being")

ἐν ἡμῖν en hēmin in us

ὀρθοτάτην orthotatēn most upright / most correct

ὑπόληψιν hypolēpsin conviction / notion / conception

περὶ Θεοῦ peri Theou regarding God

καὶ τῶν θείων kai tōn theiōn and divine things

Key Linguistic Notes

Orthotatēn (ὀρθοτάτην): This is the superlative form of orthos (straight/right). It implies the "most correct" or "most straight" possible understanding, which is why it is translated as "most upright."

Hypolēpsin (ὑπόληψιν): In a theological context, this refers to a mental grasp or a deeply held premise.

Latin Comparison: If you look at the right side of your image, the Latin uses the word persuasionem (certissimam... persuasionem) to translate this, highlighting that "faith" here is defined as a certain and firm mental persuasion.

Would you like me to explain the next part of the sentence, which describes how this faith "works through love"?

so is faith defined in this decree as mental assent? as mere knowledge?

That is an insightful question. If you only look at the first half of the sentence, it certainly sounds like "mental assent" or "intellectual conviction." However, the decree is carefully constructed to prevent faith from being viewed as mere knowledge.

In Eastern Orthodox theology (where this text originates), the definition is intentionally "synergistic"—it links the mind's conviction with the heart's action.

1. The Intellectual Aspect (Hypolēpsis)

The text uses ὑπόληψιν (hypolēpsin), which does mean a "notion" or "mental grasp." By calling it "most upright" (ὀρθοτάτην), the decree asserts that true faith must be doctrinally correct. It rejects the idea that one can have "faith" while holding false ideas about who God is.

2. The Vital Qualifier: "Working through Love"

The decree immediately qualifies the definition to move beyond "mere knowledge" with this phrase:

"...ἥτις ἐνεργουμένη διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης..." (...which [faith], working through love...)

The Greek word ἐνεργουμένη (energoumenē) is the root of our word "energy" or "active." It implies that the "upright conviction" is not static or passive; it is a faith that is "set in motion" or "made alive" by love (ἀγάπης).

3. The Definition of Action

To ensure there is no confusion about what "love" means, the decree adds a further clarification:

"...ταὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, διὰ τῶν θείων ἐντολῶν..." (...that is to say, through the divine commandments...)

Summary: Mentality vs. Reality

In this decree, faith is not "mere knowledge" because:

Knowledge is the form of faith (it must be the right "notion" of God).

Observance of Commandments is the function of faith.

The text suggests that an "upright conviction" that does not work through the commandments is not the kind of faith that "justifies us before Christ." It defines faith as a lived conviction rather than a purely academic one.

The Latin side reinforces this by using persuasionem, which in a rhetorical sense means a conviction so deep that it moves the person to act.

Would you like to look closer at the Greek word for "justifies" (δικαιοῖ) used later in the text to see how it relates to this definition?

you misunderstand. there Is no mention in this decree of faith as trust

I understand your point perfectly, and you are correct: I should have been more precise. If we look strictly at the text you provided, the word "trust" (fiducia in Latin, or a Greek equivalent like πεποίθησις) is notably absent from this definition.

You are highlighting a very specific theological shift in this document. By defining faith as ὑπόληψιν (hypolēpsin—a "notion" or "mental grasp") rather than "trust," the decree is making a pointed statement.

Why "Trust" is Missing

This document, the Confession of Dositheus, was written specifically to counter the "Protestant" ideas of Cyril Lucaris. In the 17th century, the debate over faith looked like this:

The Protestant view (which the decree rejects): Often emphasized faith as fiducia (trust/confidence in God’s promises) and "assurance" of salvation.

The Decree’s view (in your image): Defines faith as a "most upright conviction" (ὀρθοτάτην ὑπόληψιν).

By using the word ὑπόληψιν, the authors are defining faith as a formal intellectual adherence to the truths taught by the Church.

Is it "Mere" Knowledge?

You asked if it is "mere knowledge." Based strictly on the Greek text, the decree suggests that faith is orthodoxy of the mind:

Subject Matter: It is about God and divine things.

Quality: It is the "most upright" (most correct) notion.

Nature: It is a mental "taking up" or "conception" of truth.

However, the decree's authors would likely argue it isn't "mere" knowledge because it is the necessary starting point. For them, you cannot have a relationship with God based on a "false notion" of Him. Therefore, the "upright notion" is the foundation upon which everything else is built.

Summary of the Greek Definition

In this specific decree, the definition of faith is:

Correct Intellectual Content + Active Compliance (Commandments) = Justifying Faith.

The "trust" element—the personal, emotive, or relational confidence in God—is not the primary focus of this definition. The focus is on correctness and obedience.

Would you like to compare how this decree defines "justification" (δικαιοῖ) to see if that process remains purely intellectual or becomes something more?

So here we see that the words translated as "right notion" do correspond with correct knowledge. 

Greek: ὀρθοτάτην orthotatēn most upright / most correct

ὑπόληψιν hypolēpsin conviction / notion / conception

Latin: certissimam... persuasionem  certain and firm mental persuasion

No matter what language it's in, Decree 9 of the Confession of Dositheus reduces faith to knowledge or intellectual assent. Any notion of faith as trust in Christ is completely absent.